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CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERSTATE TORTS
FIEDRICH JUENGER t
Six years ago the New York Court of Appeals decided to discard
the conflict of laws rule which previously applied invariably the sub-
stantive law of the place of injury in multistate tort situations. In
Babcock v. Jackson 1 the court held that a New York auto passenger
could recover from the New York driver under New York law, although
both the negligent act and the injury occurred in Ontario, and the
Ontario guest statute would have barred recovery. Since Babcock, no
fewer than sixteen states have abandoned the lex loci delicti rule and
endorsed novel solutions of tort choice of law problems.2 Several diver-
sity courts 3 and the District of Columbia have followed suit.' It seems
clear that lex loci is no longer the federal choice of law rule.5 This is
a remarkable development considering that the rule was once followed
in word, if not in deed, by virtually every court in the United States.'
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University. LL.B. 1960, Columbia University;
M.C.L. 1958, (Jniversity of Michigan.
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1 12 N.Y2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S2d 743 (1963).
2 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P2d 699 (Alas. 1968) ; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103
Ariz. 562, 447 P2d 254 (1968) ; Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63
Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E2d 544 (1966);
Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W2d 410 (1965) ; Wessling v. Paris, 417
S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W2d 254
(1968) ; Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss. 1968) ; Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d
173 (Mo. 1969); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A2d 205 (1966); Mellk v.
Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A2d 625 (1967) ; Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co.,
247 Ore. 274, 428 P2d 898 (1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1,
203 A.2d 796 (1964); Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917 (R.I. 1968), petition
for cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1969); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157
N.W2d 579 (1968).
3 Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965); Lowe's North
Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Life Ins. Co.. 319 F2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963);
Zucker v. Vogt, 200 F. Supp. 340 (D. Conn. 1961), aff'd, 329 F2d 426 (2d Cir. 1964);
cf. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D.
1967) (applying presumed modem state conflicts rule via the choice of law provisions
of the Federal Torts Claims Act). Contra Brendle v. General Tire & Rubber Co.,
408 F2d 116 (4th Cir. 1969); Gormson v. Capital Airlines, 345 F2d 750 (6th Cir.
1965) ; Bannowski v. Krauser, 294 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Colo. 1969).
4 See Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
5 See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959);
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) ; Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d
14 (3d Cir.) (opinion upon rehearing), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968); McClure
v. United States Lines Co., 368 F2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); cf. Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
6 See generally G. STUMBERG, PRINcIPLES op CONFLIcT OF LAws 181-83 (3d ed.
1963) ; 11 Am. JUR. Conflict of Laws § 182 (1937) ; 16 Am. Jum. 2d Conflict of Laws
§71 (1964).
(202)
INTERSTATE TORTS
Courts that still feel bound to look exclusively to the state of injury for
the substantive rules governing multistate torts do so half-heartedly,
out of respect for certainty and stare decisis, rather than from conviction
of the soundness of the old rule.7 The others have embraced modern
conflicts thinking cheerfully, and the terms, "significant relationship," 8
"governmental interest," 9 "policy," 10 "concern," " and "false con-
flict" 12 have become part and parcel of the judicial vocabulary.
This conflicts revolution 1 3 was motivated by the pronunciamentos
of legal scholars. It was inspired principally by the attacks of Cook,14
Lorenzen,"3 and Yntema 1 on the vested rights theory and the First
Restatement by Cavers's influential early article,1 7 by Ehrenzweig's calls
for law and reason,"5 and by Currie's essays on governmental interest
analysis. 9 Understandably, judicial adoption of new techniques for
the solution of choice of law problems has been applauded by aca-
demicians." Nonetheless, even among those who warmly welcomed
7 McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966);
Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966) ; Friday v. Smoot, - Del. -
211 A.2d 594 (1965); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 749, rev'g
on rehearing, 201 So2d 743 (Fla. 1967) ; Abendschein v. Farrell, - Mich. -, 170
N.W.2d 137 (1969) ; Browning v. Shackelford, 196 So. 2d 365 (Miss. 1967) ; Petrea
v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E2d 278 (1965); Cherokee Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Rogers, 398 P2d 520 (Okla. 1965); Marmon v. Mustang Aviation,
Inc., 416 S.W2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), aff'd, 430 S.W2d 182 (1968); see
McDaniel v. Sian, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P2d 1018 (1965) ; Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C.
249, 136 S.E2d 303 (1964). But see White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763
(1966).
S E.g., Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P2d 254 (1968); Griffith v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
9 E.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967);
Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966).
10 E.g., Swanson v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 275 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 NJ. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967).
1 E.g., Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
12 E.g., Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F2d 426 (2d Cir. 1964).
13 The phrase is borrowed from Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts
Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 H~Av. L. REv. 377 (1966).
14 W. CooK, THE LOGI AL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CoNFICT OF LAws (1942).
15 Lorenzen & Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, 83 U. PA. L.
REv. 555 (1935); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws,
33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924).
10 Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE LJ. 468
(1928).
17 Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 H Av. L. REV. 173
(1933).
1 8 For this phase of Ehrenzweig's writing see Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic
Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MicH. L. REv. 637 & Note (1960).
19 B. Cunma, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWs (1963) [hereinafter
cited as CuSaIE]; Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEFMP. PROB.
754 (1963).
20 See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict
of Laws, 63 COLUm. L. Rv. 1212 (1963) (by Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig,
Leflar, and Reese).
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this development there is no agreement either on the methods to be
followed by the courts or the results to be derived in a particular case
from a given method. Authors, usually found peacefully united in a
string citation, are often at loggerheads in a lively debate that has
contributed to a literature of impressive magnitude and quality. To an
increasing extent this literature is marked by critical comment rather
than adulation for the handiwork of the courts." Cavers made an
eloquent case for new principles,22 which may have earned him the title
of counterrevolutionary.2 Other authors entirely reject current ap-
proaches, primarily because of practical considerations.24 They com-
plain that the unfreezing of conflicts law has led to vacillation on the
part of the courts, to uncertainty on the part of judges, lawyers, and
clients, and to a body of law which is unmanageable and obscure. In-
deed, the richly annotated opinions, frequent appeals, separate concur-
rences and vociferous dissents in the home state of Babcock - indicate
that this decision has created more problems than it has resolved. Such
uncertainty may be too high a price to pay for the abolition of a rule,
however "wooden," "mechanical," or "ossified" it may have been.
The unsatisfactory state of the law is not simply a product of the
uncertainty that accompanies new learning; nor does the fault lie entirely
with the eclecticism of the courts or with their failure to use properly
and consistently the methodologies proffered by theoreticians. Al-
though judges are wont to base decisions on alternative choice of law
theories and to use terminology indiscriminately,26 the problem inheres
in the nature of the modern approaches rather than their practical
application.
21 Suggestive title headings reveal a certain disenchantment with the present
state of conflicts law. See, e.g., Note, Conflict in the Conflict of Laws: A Need for
Uniformity, 61 Nw. L. REv. 329 (1966); Comment, Conflict of Laws: Guest Statutes
Four Years After the Millennium, 20 ALA. L. REv. 90 (1967).
22 D. CAvEas, TE CHoicE oF LAw PRocEss (1965) [hereinafter cited as CAvERs].
23 Compare Ehrenzweig, supra note 13, with Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alli-
ance for Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process,
46 TEx. L. Rnv. 141 (1967).
24 Foley, Fragmentation in the Conflict of Laws, 47 OREGON L. REv. 377 (1968);
LaBrum, The Fruits of Babcock and Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty and Forum
Shopping, 54 A.B.A.J. 747 (1968) ; Rosenberg, An Opinion for the New York Court
of Appeals, in Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 459 (1967);
Rosenberg, in Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 551, 641 (1968);
Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson--A Practicing Attorney's Reflections Upon the Opinion
and Its Implications, 31 INs. COUNSEL J. 428 (1964).
25 See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y2d 12, 237 N.E2d 877, 290 N.Y.S2d 734
(1968) ; Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y2d 289, 221 N.E2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966) ;
Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E2d 792, 262 N.Y.S2d 463 (1965). For a
recent list of New York cases citing Babcock, see Baer, Two Approaches to Guest
Statutes in the Conflict of Laws: Mechanical Jurisprudence Versus Groping for
Contacts, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 537, 554-55 n.105 (1967).
2This tendency has been noted by R. CRAM oTON & D. CUaaI, CoNFLICT oF
LAws 257 (1968). It is discussed and exemplified by Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 1968
ANNUAL SuRVEY oF Am. LAw 31, 45-46 (1969).
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While these theories purport to apply across the board to all choice
of law situations, they have created difficulties primarily in the law of
torts.17  It therefore seems appropriate to inquire into the assumptions
underlying modern methods of analysis, the workability of such
methods, and the alternatives available, with specific regard to choice
of law in tort cases. However, some general comment on the nature
of the approaches courts have adopted is required since the main char-
acteristic of pertinent case law is its strong reliance on theory.
28
I. CURRENT METHODOLOGIES
A. Governmental (Forum) Interests
The term "interest," in the context of determining the reach of
forum law, was originally used by the Supreme Court in workmen's
compensation cases 29 in which the Court rejected the argument that
it was unconstitutional to apply forum law to transactions involving
certain contacts with other states. These arguments were derived from
earlier holdings which suggested that the Constitution might compel a
given choice of law,3" or at least limit substantially the application of
the lex fori.31 In allowing the states to claim a fairly broad territorial
reach for their workmen's compensation acts, the Court decided, in the
words of Paul Freund, "what a state court might legitimately do, not
what it should preferably do as a matter of choice of law within a per-
missible latitude under the Constitution." 32 But Freund also believed
that the Court's opinions "are suggestive of an approach in conflicts
cases generally." 11 Brainerd Currie postulated a "governmental" inter-
est of every state in the effectuation of the policies underlying its laws, an
interest to which he attributed extraordinary strength and vitality.'
2 See A. EHRENZWEIG, PaivATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 70, 72-73 (1962).
28 Some of the cases have inspired symposia. E.g., Rosenberg & Trautman, Two
Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 459 (1967) ; Comments on Babcock
v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1212
(1963) ; Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 551 (1968).
29 Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus-
trial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); see CumuIE 201-05, 613-14.
30Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
3 1Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143
(1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
82 Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1210,
1220 (1946) ; see CuRuua 613-14.
3 Freund, supra note 32, at 1220.
34See generally Cu Rm, which is a collection of several of the author's law
review articles. A summary of the method appears in chapter 4 at 183-84, which
originally appeared as Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws, 1959 DuxE L.J. 171, 178. Currie subsequently modified his views somewhat.
See articles cited in notes 19-20 supra. A later summary of the method prepared by
Currie appears in E. CHEATHAM, E. GRIsvoLD, W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CoNFrcT
OF LAWS 477-78 (5th ed. 1964).
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Under his theory courts are duty-bound not to sacrifice the forum state's
interest. 5 Their function in the area of choice of law should be limited
to ascertaining the relevant policies of the competing laws and, if the
forum is legitimately interested, to apply the lex fori so as to effectuate
its policies. Currie warned that relinquishing forum interests uni-
laterally in favor of interstate justice would be "quixotic." 3 A mutual
give and take through diplomatic and political techniques might be
proper for the legislature, but he characterized the prospect of "trading
off . . . the rights of one group of citizens for those of another . . .
[as] not . . wholesome . . . . " Currie conceded that a state's
choice of law rules also express a policy, but argued that it was a policy
of a much lower order than the social and economic policies of laws that
are directly designed to further the concerns of the government and
the people.88
From these premises Currie concluded that, given a legitimate
interest in its application, forum law must be applied irrespective of any
countervailing interest of some other jurisdiction, even though such a
competing interest might be superior. In later writings, however,
he urged courts to exercise restraint and moderation in finding a
forum interest, and a modicum of altruism in recognizing competing
interests of other states.3 9
Only the brilliance of Currie's writing can explain the acceptance
of the idea of compelling governmental interests. Apart from the
unappealing nature of the beggar-thy-neighbor principle,4" his teachings
ignore the experience of centuries. Ever since conflicts law first de-
veloped, courts did precisely what Currie would forbid them to do; no
judge has ever been impeached for inventing or applying a choice of
law rule that sacrifices forum interests. Even in jurisdictions such as
France, where strong views on the separation of powers are held, judges
35 Cnu= 190.
361d. n.5.
37 Id.
38
A choice-of-law rule does express a policy, but it is not of the same order as
the social and economic policies which are normally developed by a state in
the pursuit of its governmental interests and the interests of its people. ...
[Tihe policy is that the state, as a member of the community of states, will
join in a fairly general movement that imposes a degree of restraint upon
its sovereignty and upon the pursuit of its selfish interests . . . . This is but
a mild, tentative, and self-denying policy.
Id. 52-53.
39 See notes 19-20 supra.
40 Currie tends to personify states, attributing to them such characteristics as
selfishness and sacrifice. See, e.g., Cu=nIE 53, 89, 112, 180.
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have manufactured conflicts law in full view of complacent legislatures. 1
When legislatures chose to deal with the subject, they enacted rules
similar to those previously developed by judges. The postulate of
judicial impotence seems peculiarly inappropriate in tort law, since the
pervasive policies underlying substantive law in that area are largely
the creatures of judicial lawmaking'.
It is not surprising, therefore, that courts on the whole have
tended to decide tort choice of law cases on grounds broader than those
suggested by Currie,42 even though a definite tendency to apply forum
law is discernible.43 In fact, the manner in which they attempt to
balance interests and policies of the various jurisdictions in multistate
tort cases ' cogently demonstrates the power and competence of common
law judges to deal freely with such commodities.
B. Functional Analysis
Ehrenzweig, himself an advocate of the expanded application of
forum law, and Rheinstein have seriously questioned whether a state
has much of an interest in effecting the policies underlying its private
law.
4 5
Although there is no verification of the existence of such interests,
a substantial number of courts nevertheless accept the term "inter-
ests," " (or its equivalent "concerns" 47) as a key term of choice of
law analysis. That judges like these words is understandable in view
of the frequency with which the Supreme Court and other tribunals
4 1 See H. BATIFFOL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRivL 20-21 (4th ed. 1967). In other
civil law countries as well, conflicts law is largely judge-made. See 1 E. RABE., THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STuDv 42-43, 45 (2d ed. 1958).
42 See note 26 .rpra & accompanying text; R. LEFLAR, AmmIuIcAII CONFLIcTS
LAW 328 (rev. ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as LEFLAR].
43 Of the 15 cases cited in note 2 supra, 14 applied the lex fori.
4 4 See, e.g., Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Reich
v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Griffith v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) ; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617,
133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
45A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 350 (1962) [hereinafter cited as EIRanN-
zwEIG, TREATISE ]; A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as EHRENZWEIG, P.I.L.]; Rheinstein, Book Review, 11 Am. J. Comp. L.
632, 657-58, 664 (1962). But see Baade, supra note 23, at 147-49. Cavers finds the
concept dispensable. CAVERS 102. Weintraub believes that "no harm results" if the
word is used to distinguish current analysis from territorially oriented choice of
law rules. Weintraub, in Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 556
(1968); see note 90 infra.
46E.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967);
Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E2d 544 (1966); Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y2d 473, 191 N.E2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
47 E.g., Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W2d 526 (1966); Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y2d 473, 191 N.E2d 279, 240 N.Y.S2d 743 (1963).
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employ them." However, courts and legal writers who adopt
Currie's terminology do not necessarily share his conclusions. Rather,
they favor a "functional" analysis " which attempts to reconcile or
accommodate the conflicting interests of the several states involved in
a multistate transaction. Arguably, Currie himself fell in this category
when he changed his initial position and counseled moderation and re-
straint in ascertaining forum policies and interests.50 Once courts are
free to restrain and moderate they can exercise the very discretion to
sacrifice forum interests which Currie originally said they did not have.
This shift from unilateral assertion to accommodation has deprived
the concept of governmental interests of its substance. The degree to
which it has become emasculated is apparent when one considers that,
according to Cavers's interpretation, Currie's terminology merely
embodies
a conclusion that the purposes of a statute or common-law
rule would be advanced by its application . . . . Since the
rule emanates from the state, . . . the rule's purposes may
reasonably be ascribed to the state ....
[I]t [is] reasonable to ascribe to the state a desire
to have the purposes of its laws effectuated .... "I
So conceived, the word "interest" no longer connotes an affirmative,
viable aspect of governmental endeavor. It has become a mere figure
of speech which expresses the doubtful assumption that states "desire"
to have their laws applied in preference to the laws of other jurisdictions,
an assumption which finds no firmer support than the bare fact that a
statute was once passed or a common law rule left unchanged. Stripped
of their trimmings, "governmental interests" appear no less fictitious
than the metaphoric vesting of rights. What remains is the idea that
4 8 See, e.g., cases cited note 29 supra.
The Supreme Court cases in particular seem to use the term "interests" merely
to embody the conclusion that under the circumstances it was not unreasonable to
apply forum law. The Court could have justified this conclusion by simply looking
to the contacts. See LELAR 137:
Courts deciding conflicts cases have as often as not accompanied their refer-
ences to factual contacts in a state with references to the local concerns or
interests which grew out of these contacts . . . . Comparable language
undertaking to identify social, political, economic, and even cultural interests
attributable to a state because of the incidence of local factors in a litigated
case has been employed hundreds of times.
49 The current use of this term in the conflicts setting was promoted primarily
by its use in A. voN MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAw OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS
(1965). It is used here to differentiate Currie's approach from that adopted by
most courts and writers.
50 See note 34 supra; CAVERS 73; EH ,ENZWEIG, P.I.L. 64-65. See also Traynor,
Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF.
L. REv. 845 (1961).
51 CAVERS 100.
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a proper approach to choice of law must take into account the policies
underlying competing substantive rules in a multistate situation, which
policies are assumed to have a bearing on the spatial reach of the rules.
In conflicts law, as elsewhere, the words "policy," "interest," "pur-
pose," or "legislative intent" are invoked to justify a result that does
not follow from the letter of the law. They are devices used to expand
or contract a rule, while at the same time professing faithfulness to its
tenets. According to Currie, "[t]he process of defining policy and
interest is the process of construction and interpretation . . ,2
However, he conceded that when courts or legislatures coin a substantive
rule, they generally give no thought to its territorial purport.53 One
should conclude that the bare existence of a law cannot serve as the
basis for any inference concerning its spatial reach, other than that the
"lawmaker intended" " to have it apply within the limits of existing or
future choice of law rules. Instead, the policy analysts substitute their
own judgment about the reasonable reach of the law for a nonexistent
legislative intent.5 This judgment is most frequently based on some
form of personality principle.56 Thus, in his pilot article on married
women's contracts, Currie assumed that the Massachusetts law denying
contractual capacity was obviously designed to protect Massachusetts
wives." However, the policy underlying the disability not only ante-
dates nation-states and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, but had
a much more universal purport.58  Quite generally, the idea that laws
exist merely for the benefit and protection of subjects seems strangely
at odds with the realities of twentieth century America. The interest
02 Cup=s 604.
53 See id. 82; Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 686 (1963).
4 Compare Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1930), with
Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HAv. L. REv. 886 (1930).
55
[T]he legislature never thought about the matter at all. Hence a court follow-
ing this approach must inquire what the legislature would have intended, or
should have intended, had it thought about the problem. Since the court
will naturally assume that the legislature was composed of reasonable men,
it will almost inevitably suppose that the legislature would have been moved
by the same considerations as would have moved the court ...
[A] court that adheres to . . . [this] approach will pretend to be effectuating
the intentions of the legislature.
Reese, supra note 53, at 686.
See also CAvFRs 96-97; LEFLAR 229-30. The latter states that this "pseudo-inter-
pretative process" is, in fact, an application of standard choice-of-law considerations.
56 See, e.g., CAvEms 134-36.
67 "What married women? Why, those with whose welfare Massachusetts is
concerned, of course-i.e., Massachusetts married women." Cumiux 85.
58 See generally P. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW 271-78 (3d ed. 1966); J. MADDEN,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DoMESTic RELATIoNs 96-98 (1931).
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states may have in the application of rules of private law and the policy
underlying such rules, hopefully, is to see justice done " and to protect
the "welcome visitor." 0
Considerations of a more practical nature also suggest that an
analysis based on policies and purposes does not offer a satisfactory
basis for the resolution of tort choice of law problems. The difficulties
that accompany the litigation of foreign law issues " would be com-
pounded by the added requirement of having to establish foreign policies
as well as foreign rules. Often a rule does not reflect a clear-cut
policy,' or is the result of a compromise between conflicting policies."3
Use of such vague terminology invites courts to take short cuts and
make ad hoc decisions since "some reasons, usually a variety of them,
can be called up in support of almost any rule of law . . . . " Since
the functional approach implies that policies of conflicting rules are
weighed and balanced for each issue, and since it looks to policies in
addition to those abstracted from domestic rules, these practical diffi-
culties are exacerbated.
If an analysis of policies is called for, one might ask why this
analysis should not concentrate on the policies embodied in choice of
law rules."' They are the only rules specifically designed to effectuate
any interests that a state may have in the application of its law in multi-
state situations. If such rules are statutory, as they are in many
countries, a court must apply them. If they are judge-made, they are
the best evidence of what courts have thought to be the most appropriate
solution of conflicts problems. As noted earlier, from the point of view
of "legislative intent," the indifference of most legislatures can be inter-
preted as deference to judicial wisdom, unless one excludes the possi-
59 Scoles, in Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 563, 567 (1968).
'O Leflar, in Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 637, 639 (1968).
61 See Rheinstein, stpra note 45, at 663. The difficulties in ascertaining and estab-
lishing foreign law are vividly discussed in CumE 3-76, commenting on Walton
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
02See CuRRIE 608-09. He suggests "[iln all solemnity" that if there are laws
that do not express any governmental policy, the law of the state first in alphabetical
order should be selected.
63
Even the simple rules that raise rights and duties with regard to personal
injuries are a composite of thrusts and counter-thrusts of many kinds ...
To try to bring all of the huffing and puffing together into a policy that runs
clearly in one direction and that has a measurable intensity that permits
comparing it with some contrary policy is . . . pure fantasy.
Rosenberg, in Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, An Opinion for the New York Court
of Appeals, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 459, 464 (1967).
64 LEFLAR 252. He also notes that "it is nearly always possible for a good lawyer
to conjure up governmental interests in just about any state that has any connection
with a set of facts." Id.
65 "All rules of law, and choice-of-law rules are no exception, are the product
of policies." Reese, mpra note 53, at 681.
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bility that conflicts law expresses a policy or assumes that such policy
is inferior to all others,6 6 an assumption which would be difficult to
justify considering the remarkable agreement throughout the world
on the necessity for conflict of laws rules.1
7
C. False Conflicts
Common to both of the above approaches is the notion of "false
conflict." 08 This term would be unobjectionable if used to describe a
multistate situation in which the laws of all of the states with which a
transaction has contacts are identical, or in which application of any
of the laws would lead to the same result. In such a case the conflict
would be "false" in the sense that it would not be necessary to make a
determination which of these laws should be applied.6 It may be noted,
however, that there is no general agreement among the courts 7 or legal
writers 71 that in these situations the result should be the same as that
which would follow from any of the potentially applicable laws.
Yet the meaning of "false conflicts" as employed by the interest
and functional analysts is another one. They use these words to refer
to cases "in which the governing rule may be drawn from the domestic
substantive law of one state, thus advancing its underlying policy, with-
out frustrating any applicable policy of another jurisdiction involved
in the case." 72 So construed, the words in effect "describe the choice
of law process itself . . . . [a]nd in . . . other cases . . . situations
in which choice of law has already been made." 71
156 See note 38 supra.
67 If this proposition needs a citation, there is hardly a more appropriate one
than the four volume masterpiece, E. 1ABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY (2d ed. 1958).
68 The terminology varies. Cavers referred to "false problems," in contra-
distinction to "true conflicts." Others speak of "no conflicts," "spurious conflicts,"
"illusory conflicts," "apparent conflicts," "avoidable conflicts," "pseudo conflicts" or
"superficial conflicts." For a discussion of these terms and their applications, see
Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 76 (1967).
69 See LEFLAR 239.
70 See Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Lillegraven v.
Tengs, 375 P.2d 139 (Alas. 1962) ; Dalton v. McLean, 137 Me. 4, 14 A2d 13 (1940) ;
Marie v. Garrison, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 210 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1883). Modem writers are
not necessarily in disagreement With such decisions. See CAVERS 39, 41, 310-11;
Wilde, DepeCage in the Choice of Tort Law, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 329 (1968) ; Com-
ment, supra note 68, at 96-100, 105-16.
71 If choice of law rules or methods permit "severability" or "splitting" of issues,
i.e., the application of the law of more than one state to different issues of the same
case, see LEFLAR 348-49, the breeding of teratoid hybrids, see CAVEES 311, and similar
creatures of a never-never law can hardly be avoided. Unless choice of law is
conceived in jurisdiction-selecting terms, plaintiff's claim "can fall between two stools,"
or the law may "put together half a donkey and half a camel" and permit him to
"rde to victory on the synthetic hybrid," two alternatives of which Currie liked
only the first. See CAvERs 39.
72 Gorman, Book Review, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 288, 291-92 (1966).
73 Comment, supra note 68, at 122.
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A number of courts have used the latter meaning of false conflicts to
decide cases.74 But conflicts are only false if policies and interests are
true. It has been shown convincingly that where potentially applicable
laws differ, analysis in terms of false conflicts amounts to an after-the-
decision technique. 75  It presupposes agreement on the proper method
of analysis, on the means used to discern interests and policies, and on
their significance and spatial purport. Thus, it has relevance and utility
only for those committed to a given method.
76
D. The Most Significant Relationship
In view of the many critical comments that have already been made
about the provisions of the Second Restatement in general and its tort
provisions in particular, 77 little more need be said about the most sig-
nificant relationship test, the criterion which the present Restatement of
Conflicts proposes to use to determine which state's law to apply.7"
Although it is printed in black letters, section 145 is not much of a
rule 79 since it fails to offer a definition of the central word "significant."
Thus, the Restatement provisions on tort choice of law appear to be
programmatic rather than normative."0 They emphasize freedom of
14 See, e.g., cases cited note 12 supra.
75 LEFLAR 238-39.
74
The concept of "false conflicts" enjoys protean facility for justifying every-
man's choice-of-law theory ....
To speak of governmental-interest analysis as a "workable means of
identifying" false conflicts is to suggest that false conflicts "exist" some-
how independently from the process which establishes them. To the extent
that a finding of false conflicts is a product of governmental-interest analysis,
it is both improper and misleading to divorce that finding from the process
which creates it.
Comment, supra note 68, at 78-79.
77 See, e.g., D. CAVERS, THE CHOIcE OF LAW PROCESS 69-72 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as CAvERs]; B. CURRiE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLIT OF LAws 594-96
(1963) [hereinafter cited as CURmE]; EHPEENWEIG, TREATisE 351, 364; EHRENZWEi,
P.I.L. 66-68, 73; Comment, The Second Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A Caveat, 51
CALIF. L. REv. 762 (1963).
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLIcT OF LAvs § 145 (Proposed Official Draft,
part II, 1968).
79
The rule of most significant relationship is undoubtedly too vague to offer
firm guidance in situations where the important contacts are divided more
or less equally among two or more states. It is believed, however, that no
more definite rule can be stated in view of the relatively unexplored state
of the field and the existing confusion among the authorities.
Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679,
697 (1963).
80
This rule of most significant relationship, at the very least, will not stand in the
way of progress. It should aid in inducing the courts to depart from the
place of injury rule in situations where this is desirable. And it should make
clear to the lawyer and litigant that it can no longer be expected that the
place of the injury rule will always be applied.
Id. 699.
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the courts from the compulsion of fixed rules and encourage them to
apply the law which they think has the strongest claim for application.
This may in fact be the best description of what many courts are doing.
It corresponds to the verbal formula used in Babcock and in several
other cases. 8'
This formula is perhaps the most poignant admission of unre-
statability.8 2 Furthermore, the necessity of focusing on contacts and
their relative importance may have the effect of inhibiting courts from
setting forth explicitly the factors that induced them to adopt a given
resolution.
Section 6(2) of the new Restatement,83 incorporated in section 145
by reference, and the discussion in the comments following that section
reflect the terminology and thinking of interest analysis. Perhaps such
an amalgamation was deemed necessary to give some substance to the
term "significant." But it places in doubt the extent to which the
Restatement's proper law test offers anything unique or distinct from
interest methodology.
At best, the Restatement provisions restate the lack of certainty
prevailing in tort choice of law. At worst, the adoption of such open-
ended provisions by the American Law Institute may serve to perpetuate
the current uncertainty and to inhibit the search for alternative solutions
to tort choice of law problems.
E. Choice-Influencing Considerations
A number of authors have attempted to state the purposes and
desiderata of conflicts law and have enumerated "choice-influencing
considerations." Cheatham and Reese 84 listed nine which found their
way into section 6 of the Draft Restatement in a somewhat modified
form. Yntema mentioned seventeen factors, but concluded that the
essential policy considerations of conflicts law could be reduced to two
81 Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D.
1967); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P2d 254 (1968); Fabricius v.
Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r
Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967) ; Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1,
203 A2d 796 (1964).
82 Compare Reese, supra note 79, at 681:
Choice of law, even now, is not ripe for restatement in the sense that it is
rarely possible to state hard and fast rules with the reasonable assurance
based on precedent and the resources of human reasoning and imagination
that these rules will work well in all situations to which they literally can
be applied.
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcT OF LAws §6 (2) (Proposed Official
Draft, part I, 1967).
84 Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLJm. L. REv. 959
(1952). See also Reese, supra note 79.
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categories-security and comparative justice."" Current judicial opinions
relying on such factors 86 generally use the formulation by Leflar, who
reduced the list to five considerations.
8 7
Leflar conceives of these factors as a means to test the results and
the reasoning of judicial decisions, rather than as rules. 8  In essence,
his list is a recognition of the freedom judges have in making choice
of law decisions, as well as an exhortation to them not only to be frank
about stating the considerations actually used, but to reach results
compatible with those considerations."9 This method is also open to
the challenge that it does not provide sufficient certainty. But at least
it has dual merit in that it inspires judicial candor and, except for its
somewhat grudging recognition of governmental interests, frees judges
from the need to resort to shibboleths and dogma. Moreover, it tends
to emphasize that courts in conflicts cases are called upon to adjudicate
private disputes, rather than to arbitrate the claims of sovereigns.'
II. APPLICATION OF CURRENT METHODOLOGIES IN PRACTICE
For the most part, the cases that have spawned the conflicts revolu-
tion involved automobile and airplane accidents,9 ' that is, situations in
85 Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. BAR REv. 721,
734-35 (1957).
8See Tiernan v. Westext Transport, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1256 (D.R.I. 1969);
Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Mitchell v. Craft,
211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968) ; Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966);
Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W2d 579 (1968).
87
(A) Predictability of results;
(B) Maintenance of interstate and international order;
(C) Simplification of the judicial task;
(D) Advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
(E) Application of the better rule of law.
LFA 243-45.
88
Obviously, the considerations do not furnish rules of thumb . . . . Wiser
judicial opinions and more thoughtful analysis of the relevant reasons for
decision may be expected if the considerations are given proper weight ....
Id. 259.
89 Leflar indicates that the relative importance of the 5 factors varies according
to the case before the court. LErxAR 245.
90 Trautman states:
[C]onflicts problems involve more than a clash between governmental
interests, and the opinion [in Reich v. Purcell] takes great care to avoid
anthropomorphizing the concerned jurisdictions. For California, Missouri,
and Ohio are not at war here, nor even are there conflicting rules designed
to further the interests of the governments of those states. Involved are
simply rules of recovery for wrongful death regarded by those states as
appropriate for adjusting claims among individuals . . . . The current obses-
sion with analysis in terms of governmental interests is usefully ignored by
the court, which again and again speaks . . . of the interests of the individ-
ual litigants.
Trautman. in Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 618, 623 (1968).
91 Of the 15 cases cited in note 2 supra, 14 involved automobile accidents and one
involved an airplane mishap.
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which the application of traditional tort rules and modes of procedure
has become increasingly controversial.92  Congested courts " and
fluctuating awards 94 are but two symptoms of the high social costs "
which tort law presently exacts. The introduction of modern conflicts
thinking into this area superimposes complexity on already vexing
problems.90
Consider, for example, the case of Kell v. Henderson,97 which in-
volved the converse factual pattern of that presented in Babcock. Two
Ontario parties, a driver and passenger, had an automobile accident in
New York, the forum state. At issue was the applicability of the
Ontario guest statute (the same issue presented in Babcock). If a judge
were to follow one suggested approach in order to decide the case,9" he
92
[T]he fault system is little more than an immoral lottery for both plaintiffs
and defendants . . . it is totally out of date as a reparation device.
Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reim-
bursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774, 778 (1967). See Ehrenzweig, P.I.L. 74 n.124.
One barometer of the current controversy is the hue and cry which has been
raised over the compensation-without-regard-to-fault doctrine embodied in the
Keeton-O'Connell plan. See INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, PROTEC-
TION FOR THE TRAFFIC VIcTIi: THE KEETON-O'CoNNELL PLAN AND ITS CRITICS
(1967); TIAI., Oct.-Nov., 1967, at 12-54. See also L. GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS:
TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958); Berger, Compensation Plans for Personal
Injuries, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 217; Ehrenzweig, "Full Aid" Insurance for the Traffic
Victimz--A Voluntary Compensation Plan, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1955); Marx, A New
Approach to Personal Injury Litigation, 19 OHno STATE L.J. 278 (1958) ; Marx, Let's
Compensate-Not Litigate, 3 FEDERATION OF INS. COuNSEL Q. 62 (1953); A Sym-
posman in Honor of Charles 0. Gregory, 53 VA. L. REv. 774 (1967) (articles by
Franklin, Fleming, Ehrenzweig, Goodhart, Paulsen, Keeton, Morris & James).
These authors were primarily concerned with automobile accidents. However, a
similar controversy rages with respect to air law. See, e.g., Vold, Strict Liability for
Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landings on Ground Victims Outside of Established
Landing Areas, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1953); Sweeney, Is Special Aviation Liability
Legislation Essential? (pts. 1-2), 19 J. Am L. & Comx. 166, 317 (1952).93 See H. ZEIsEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCHOLz, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959).
W Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MicHr. L. REv.
279, 291-92 (1964). In 2 recent cases, recovery was limited to the Brazilian statutory
maximum of 100,000 cruzeiros (less than $175). Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de
Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
943 (1966) ; Ciprari v. Servicios Aereos Cruzeiro, 245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
95 Green, supra note 92, at 81-82.
96
[W]e must watch uneasily while one victim extracts unheard-of sums in dam-
ages for harm inflicted on him by one of the unavoidable hazards of modern
enterprise, and thousands of others go uncompensated because they cannot or
will not go through the gamble, delay and perjury attending the search for
and proof of "fault" and "foreseeable" harm. In the meantime too, we must
watch uneasily while some victims of an air crash recover hundreds of
thousands of dollars in one state while victims of the same crash recover a
mere trifle in another. No wonder that in multistate cases judges, faced with
a choice between such widely and unaccountably differing, yet equally inade-
quate laws, have despaired ....
Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in Multi-
state Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 847, 84748 (1967) (footnotes omitted). See also
Kinney, The Interstate Aviation Accident-What Law Governs, 31 INS. COUNSEL J.
250 (1964).
97 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S2d 552 (1966).
98 See Trautman, A Comment, in Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 CoLum.
L. REV. 459, 465 (1967).
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would not only have to cope with the intricacies of a foreign guest
statute,9 but he would also have to analyze the policies underlying that
statute,0 0 plus the general tort law 10' of the concerned 102 jurisdictions,
and to assess their relevance to the multistate problem. If the policies
conflict, he must suppress his instinctive forum preference. He may,
however, impeach the policy of the foreign guest statute by means of an
inquiry into its history, and he may scrutinize the cases and the law
review articles that either interpret or otherwise shed light on it. He
cannot eschew unpublished 103 and apocryphal 104 matter, legislative
studies and proposals, and pertinent statistics, for if this research in-
dicates that guest statutes in general, and the foreign one in particular,
are somewhat dated, he will be free to apply the law of the forum (which
he could have applied in any event).' He may do so because an
obsolete foreign policy does not amount to a "real" policy even if the
foreign courts keep effectuating it.' °  However, if the judge, during
99
There is perhaps no other group of statutes which have filled the courts
with appeals on so many knotty little problems involving petty and other-
wise entirely inconsequential points of law.
W. PROSSFR, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 191 (3d ed. 1964).
100 The New York Court of Appeals stated that these policies were the prevention
of collusion, and the protection of insurance companies. Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y2d 473, 191 N.E2d 279, 240 N.Y.S2d 743 (1963). But Dym v. Gordon, 16
N.Y2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S2d 463 (1965), also suggested a "trust fund"
theory, i.e, priority of recovery by third parties that might be hurt. This raises the
interesting question whether policies change with the factual situation.
101 The torts policies cited were "compensation, admonition, deterrence, and per-
haps even retribution." Trautman, supra note 98, at 466. As authority for these
policies Trautman cites Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL
PRoB. 137 (1951). He does not indicate whether New York and Ontario (the two
"concerned" jurisdictions) recognize any, either, or all of these policies as their
policies, and, if so, whether they accord them equal weight. Clearly, it would be too
much to assume that all tort laws everywhere have the same policies.
1
0 2 Trautman found a New York concern because
[i]t is not wholly irrational for New York to impose liability for negligent
conduct on its highways which might, although on these facts did not, involve
the safety of third parties, motorists, or pedestrians, on New York highways.
Admonitory and deterrent policies legitimately come into play. And it cannot
be denied that New York regards compensation as important, so that a policy
of giving evenhanded nondiscriminatory treatment with compensation to all
persons injured in New York would justify extension of its concern to On-
tario people if no contrary Ontario policy is found to exist.
Trautman, supra note 98, at 467.
103 See the reference to materials Professor Trautman was furnished by a
Canadian colleague. Trautman, supra note 98, at 470.
104
[T]he Premier of Ontario was receptive to the guest statute because he
personally had suffered the ingratitude of a pair of hitch-hikers who had sued
him successfully.
Id. (citing Linden, Comment, 40 CAN. BAR REv. 284, 286 n.11 (1962)).
105 The full faith and credit clause is inapplicable because the statute involved is
not that of a sister state, and the Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional
problem in applying the lex loci delicti because the state where the tort occurs has
a concern. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955) ; accord Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
'
0 6 See Gagnon v. Lecavalier, [1967] 2 Ont. 197.
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his research, is overcome by mental fatigue and believes that this effort
to reach a rational solution is too complex, he can simply abandon it.
10 7
Esthetics alone militates against the application of such heavy ap-
paratus to the facts in Kell. Courts have not gone quite as far. But
the economic waste inherent in the new methodology is apparent if one
reads some of the overwrought opinions 10S it produces, and considers
how little guidance these end products of protracted lawsuits furnish to
other parties, insurance companies, adjusters, counsel, or judges. In
consequence, any interstate element has the propensity for converting a
run-of-the-mill accident into a cause clgbre of baffling complexity.
Judges and lawyers must scrutinize each factual aspect, such as the
location of the garage,0 9 the purpose of the sojourn, I0 the occupation
of the parties,"' the place of boarding the car,"' family ties,"'3 the color
of the license plates,"' the name of the insurer and the place where the
policy was written,"' for its potential legal significance, however
innocuous it may seem at first blush. A collision case further compli-
cates their task, as does the fact that the medium of disaster happened
to be a common carrier." 6 Litigation is encouraged, and the likelihood
of appeals and remands is increased. In sum, the parties pay more for
"flexibility" than they used to pay for rigidity.
107 Trautman, supra note 98, at 473.
108 See, e.g., Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Dym
v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) ; Casey v. Manson
Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967) ; Griffith v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). Looking through these cases, one cannot help
but wonder whether the parties ever had occasion to read any of them. To the
layman, such opinions must sound like a mockery of the loser's plight, if not of justice.
'
0 9 See Meilk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A2d 625 (1967) ; Babcock v. Jackson,
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
110 See, e.g., Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 146, 158 N.W2d 254, 259
(1968) ; Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y2d 120, 209 N.E2d 792, 262 N.Y.S2d 463 (1965).
1I See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699, 703 (Alas. 1968).
112 See, e.g., Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810, 815 (D. Minn. 1968) ; Schneider
v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 145, 158 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1968).
' 13 Macey v. Rozbicld, 18 N.Y2d 289, 221 N.E2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
114 See Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966) ; Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y2d 473, 191 N.E2d 279, 240 N.Y.S2d 743 (1963).
115 See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 32-33, 216 A.2d 781, 783 (1966);
Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W2d 579 (1968).
116 The place where the carrier is registered to do business, see, e.g., Long v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y2d 337, 341, 213 N.E.2d 796, 798, 266
N.Y.S.2d 513, 516 (1965) ; Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796
(1964), and the place where the contract was made, see, e.g., Gore v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 373 F2d 717, 724 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y2d
34, 38, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 134 (1961), became relevant factors. In
addition, the very fact that there was a contract of carriage (as opposed to the
gratuitous host-guest relationship found in many of the automotive cases) poses the
additional problem whether the suit should be brought in trespass or assumpsit. See,
e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961) ; cf. Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A2d 796 (1964) ;
Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F2d 14 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
979 (1968).
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The consequences of applying current methodologies in practice
have been strongly criticized. Rosenberg, commenting on Kell v.
Henderson, said, "The bar and lower courts are flabbergasted by [Bab-
cock v. Jackson]. A New York lawyer with a guest statute case has
more need of an ouija board today than a copy of Shepard's cita-
tions." 117 Noting the ill effects that uncertainty may produce, Rosen-
berg later wrote:
Wrongful death actions arising from highway accidents are,
unfortunately, commonplace events. The law may not deal
with them as if they were rare and esoteric conundrums, con-
ceived for the titillation of philosophers and far removed from
real world concerns. Scholars, in their fascination with con-
flicts, should not forget that the game is not being played so
they can flex their jurisprudential muscles, but in order to
better the human condition through law.
The responsibility of conflicts specialists is to devise as good
a system as possible for resolving multistate road accident
problems. At a minimum, their duty is to assure that the law
does not add legal chaos to the great human tragedy of a fatal
collision."8
These thoughts are echoed by others? 9 In a more understated fashion,
one of the exponents of modem methodology has expressed his un-
easiness with the state of the case law:
My own efforts and my observation of the efforts of con-
temporary courts and scholars to extract guidance for choice
of law from the purposes of the forum's and the other state's
laws have convinced me that the process is more difficult than
Professor Currie's advocacy would lead one to believe.
The problem we face today is not how to exorcise choice of
law rules and principles but how to develop them."
The crux of the matter is that the abandonment of the safety and
comfort of conventional wisdom has led to a dual fragmentation:
proliferation of connecting factors and splitting of issues. This poses
no insurmountable problem as long as criteria are made available to
determine which of these factors is paramount with regard to each
117 Rosenberg, An Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, in Two Views
on Kell v. Henderson, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 459, 460 (1967).
118 Rosenberg, in Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 551, 641,
644-45 (1968).
119 See authors cited note 24 supra.
= CAvmEs 108, 113.
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issue. Currie's methodology, which simply favored the forum, could
yield results, but any improvement upon this learning (including
Currie's own),21 that seeks to balance or accommodate interests and
policies is unworkable. Policies are an elusive matter. They derive
"reality" and "significance" only through the predilections of the
decision-maker; yardsticks have never been devised to measure them,
nor scales to weigh them.
The practical problems posed by the functional approach are illus-
trated by the graph in Currie's famous article, which depicts how four
connecting factors generate sixteen possible combinations in a two-state
situation.'22 The domicile and residence of either party and of their
beneficiaries, and the various places of garaging, insurance, licensing,
injury, starting and terminating a trip, and entering into a host-guest
relationship, have all been recognized as contacts properly taken into
account in guest statute cases.' 23 Assuming these contacts are suffi-
ciently divided among three or more states, the mathematics for deter-
mining the number of cases necessary to settle the law are depressingly
intricate. The expenditure of manpower necessary to litigate these cases
is staggering. 24
This state of affairs is regrettable. The lack of certainty and
predictability cannot be justified by the facile argument that torts are
generally not premeditated.' The most pressing questions about the
law are those asked after the fact. The obfuscation that exists in
conflicts law would certainly not be tolerated in substantive tort rules.
The courts that have followed the lure of interest and policy
analysis might have done well to consider more carefully the wisdom
of ridding themselves of one dogma only to embrace another. The
experience with the vested rights theory should have demonstrated the
undesirability of burdening the task of decision-making with metalegal
speculation. Theories, systems, methods, and approaches have become
the bane of tort choice of law. The time seems ripe for administering
121 See notes 34 & 50 suPra & accompanying text.
1= CumuE 84.
13 See Baer, Two Approaches to Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws: Mechan-
ical Jurisprudence Versus Groping for Contacts, 16 BuFFALO L. REV. 537, 555 (1967) ;
O'Rourke, Analysis of the Contacts Test: A Numerical Evaluation of Babcock v.
Jackson, 11 PRAc. LAw. 87, 92 (May 1965).
124 Baer cites no less than 40 New York cases which refer to Babcock v. Jackson.
A count of the cases listed in Shepard's Citations shows that this number as of July,
1969, grew to over 90.
15This unreasoned statement has unfortunately become a favorite with both
courts and legal writers. See, e.g., Tiernan v. Westext Transport, Inc., 295 F. Supp.
1256, 1263 (D.R.I. 1969); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 354, 222 A2d 205, 208
(1966) ; Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 108, 156 N.W2d 466,
470 (1968) ; R. L-FLAR, AMEICAN CoNxL.IcTs LAw 245-47 (rev. ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as LEFLAR] ; Reese, in Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development
it Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1251, 1254 (1963).
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a generous injection of pragmatism to a body of law suffering from an
overdose of orthodoxies, new and old.
III. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
A. Lex Loci Delicti
If practicability is the object, resuscitation of the lex loci rule might
be the answer. Even though it has been much maligned, this rule is
still the law in a majority of jurisdictions, 6 and the Draft Restatement
has not entirely discarded it. 7 Foreign courts and legislatures with an
impressive consensus have opted for some form of lex loci.2s
Many of the arguments advanced against the rule (seldom in
isolation and usually spiked with invective) are unconvincing. To
condemn it because it was incorporated into the first Restatement, and
was therefore identified with the vested rights theory," infers guilt
from association. In many jurisdictions lex loci prevails, even though
the local jurists may never have adopted the vested rights dogma, or
may have long rejected it.' In this country, the rule appears to have
preceded the doctrine.3 ' Some courts like to characterize the place of
accidents that occur in the course of long distance travel as "fortui-
126 Compare 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 8(4) (1967) with id. § 12(2). See
also 16 Am. JuR. 2d Conflict of Laws § 71 (1964).
=2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (Proposed Official
Draft, part II, May 1, 1968).
128 See generally 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
235-300 (2d ed. 1960). Rabel lists statutory rules, case law, and legal writers of
over 20 nations, as well as treaties. Id. 235-36 n.20. The term lex loci delicti com-
missi as used by Rabel and in the text can refer either to the place of injury or the
place of acting. The Restatements selected the place of injury, where conduct and
injury occurred in different states. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934)
expressed this in the form of a "last event" rule, while RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (Proposed Official Draft, part II, May 1, 1968) specifically
states that the local law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred applies. In
contrast, European countries tend to favor the place of acting. 2 E. RABEL, THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 303-04 (2d ed. 1960). See also Ehren-
zweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus
the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1951) ; Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A
Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TuL. L. REv. 4 (1944).
'29See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, introductory note at 2
(Proposed Official Draft, part II, May 1, 1968). Concerning the clues to the conflicts
philosophy of the Reporter of the first Restatement see D. CAVERs, THE CHOICE OF
LAW PROCESS 6-7 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CAvERs]; Cheatham, American Theories
of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361, 365, 385 (1945) ;
Compare Beale, Social Justice and Business Costs-A Study in the Legal History of
Today, 49 HAv. L. REv. 593 (1936).
13o Concerning the fate of the vested rights theory here and abroad see A. EHEN-
ZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 317-25 (1962) [hereinafter cited as EHRENZWEIG,
TREATISE] ; A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-62 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as EHRENZWEIG, P.I.L.].
131 See, e.g., Davis v. New York & N.E.R.R., 143 Mass. 301 (1887) ; Nashville
& C.R.R. v. Sprayberry, 67 Tenn. 341 (1874); Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry., 38
Vt. 294 (1865).
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tous," 132 a practice which has been criticized by authors who have little
sympathy for the lex loci rule. 3' This "overworked epithet" 1 4 can
of course apply to any connecting factor, including domicile, 3 5 and to
any given configuration of connecting factors.
A more serious argument against the rule is the impossibility of
localizing intangible injuries,136 such as loss of good will and impairment
of reputation. In the case of torts such as fraud, defamation, unfair
competition, and invasion of privacy, the wrongful act is not directed
against an object having a physical location, and thus there is no "place
of injury." This consideration, however, would not justify wholesale
abolition of the rule; it merely suggests the need for more appropriate
contacts in situations in which use of this connecting factor makes no
sense.'
3 7
The rule has also been criticized as simplistic, but its retention does
not preclude certain refinements. Rather than using the law of the place
of the injury like a blunderbuss to govern all issues, selection of another
law might be proper for certain issues,' 38 such as charitable immunity,'39
releases, 140 and intrafamily liability. 4'
Even if one believes in governmental interests and the need to
accommodate them, the lex loci rule might have appeal as the most
practical accommodation of these interests. The law of each state would
get its turn, and at the same time the problems that now vex the courts
132See, e.g., Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965); Duffy
v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn 1968); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268,
132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.Zd 34, 172 N.E2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961);
Woodward v. Stewart, - R.I. -, 243 A2d 917 (1968), petition for cert. dismissed,
393 U.S. 957 (1969).
'33 See CAvERs 311-12; Trautman, supra note 89, at 465-66.
134 CAVERS 311-12.
-135 See id. In view of the increasing mobility of people, the concept of domicile
is losing reality and significance. See LEFLAR 15-16. Compare RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 (1934), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs
§ 11 (Proposed Official Draft, part I, May 2, 1967). See also, e.g., Hopkins v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 749, 752, rev'g on rehearing, 201 So. 2d 743
(Fla. 1967).
'
36 See generally LEF.AR 333-40.
137 For possible approaches see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 148-55 (Proposed Official Draft, part II, May 1, 1968).
13S RESTATEMENT (SECOND) favors a differentiated approach. See the groupings
of "Particular Torts" in chapter 7, topic 1, title B (§§ 146-55), and of "Particular
Issues" in title C (§§ 156-74) (Proposed Official Draft, part II, May 1, 1968).
13 9 See Blum v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 40 Misc. 2d 1056, 244 N.Y.S2d
351 (Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'd on other grounds, 21 App. Div. 2d 683, 250 N.Y.S2d 522
(1964). But see Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 5 N.Y2d 1016, 158
N.E2d 128, 185 N.Y.S2d 268 (1959). See generally CAVERs 19-58.
3
4 0 See Manos v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D. Ill. 1968);
Daily v. Somberg, 28 N.J. 372, 146 A2d 676 (1958) ; Root v. Kaufman, 48 Misc. 2d
468, 265 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Civ. Ct. 1965).
141 See Roscoe v. Roscoe, 379 F2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ; Emery v. Emery, 45
Cal. 2d 421, 289 P2d 218 (1955); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d
66 (1966).
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could be avoided in the common interest of all. While the selection of
the place of injury may be arbitrary, any other connecting factor might
prove equally arbitrary. It is not unheard of to apply a mechanical
solution to the allocation of jurisdiction among sovereigns. Witness,
for example, the rules on penal jurisdiction in ship collisions.142 The
very fact that the lex loci rule is simple and mechanical would produce
decisions untainted by provincial bias and eliminate manipulation. In-
deed, its impartiality evokes the very image of blindfolded justice.
Yet, the dispassionate neutrality of lex loci may be a vice rather
than a virtue. Cavers said a generation ago that "the fabric of this
blindfold is a legal theory." 143 Judges do not exclude from considera-
tion the consequences that follow from application of competing rules.
Their predilection for desirable results led them, before the current
wave of outright abolition, to evade the consequences of the lex loci rule
by devious means. The resort to "cover up devices" has been sufficiently
documented and requires no further comment.'" The vice of lex loci
is that its guaranty of neutrality implies a disclaimer of quality in the
results following from its application.
B. Teleological Approaches
Why are the results produced by such an innocuous rule so un-
satisfactory that courts have felt compelled either to evade or abolish
it? The categories of cases that induced courts to adopt new rationales
suggest an answer. These decisions primarily involved guest statutes,145
intrafamily immunity,146 wrongful death limitations,' 47 and the survival
of actions. 48 The perusal of a standard treatise on the law of torts
indicates the extent to which the law on these points is replete with relics
142See Convention on the High Seas, March 24, 1961, [1962] art. 11(1), 13
U.S.T. 2316, T.I.A.S. No. 5200. This treaty provides that penal proceedings can
be instituted only by authorities of the flag state or the state of which defendant
is a national.
143 Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HAv. L. Rlv. 173,
180 (1933).
'44 See generally LEFLAR 212-17, 257-58, 323-24.
145 See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A2d 205 (1966); Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E2d 279, 240 N.Y.S2d 743 (1963).
'
4 6 See, e.g., Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Johnson v.
Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A2d 781 (1966).
147 See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31
(1967) ; Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S2d 734 (1968).
148 See, e.g., Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
Other types of cases evince a similar trend to grant recovery to injured plaintiffs.
See, e.g., Gaither v. Myers, 404 F2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (owner's liability);
Swanson v Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 275 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (direct action
statute) ; Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968) (contributory negligence);
Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y2d 198, 229 N.E2d 36, 282 N.Y.S2d 248 (1967) (owner's
liability).
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inspired by outdated philosophies or fostered by lobbyist pressures. 49
These "drag[s] on the coattails of civilization" '", promote no useful
social purpose. Opinions that have attempted to articulate the policies
behind such rules by applying modern methods of analysis have illus-
trated their flimsiness.' It is no wonder that courts are inclined to
shun them. Applied without corrective, the lex loci rule will inevitably
produce hardships, not because it is a bad rule, but because it invokes
bad law. To cure the problem at its roots would require an overhaul
of the substantive law. But widespread law reform is only a faint hope,
and in the meantime judges must dispose of cases. The "looseness in
the joints of the apparatus" 152 of conflicts law may well induce a court
to use it in such a manner as to avoid invidious results.
149See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 190-91 (guest statutes),
428 (contributory negligence), 879 (intrafamily immunity), 923-37 (wrongful death)
(3d ed. 1964).
150 Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUm. L. REV. 959,
978-80 (1952).
151
The only reasons that have ever been given . . . for enactment of its
[Vermont's] guest statute are (1) to protect kindly hosts from ungrateful
guests ("don't bite the hand that feeds you"), and (2) to protect liability
insurance companies from suits brought by guests colluding with their
hosts....
The automobile guest statutes were enacted in about half the states, in
the 1920's and early 1930's, as a result of vigorous pressures by skillful
proponents. Legislative persuasion was largely in terms of guest relationships
(hitchhikers) and uninsured personal liabilities that are no longer character-
istic of our automotive society. . . . The problems of automotive accident
law then were not what they are today. . . . No American state has newly
adopted a guest statute for many years. Courts of states which did adopt
them are today construing them much more narrowly, evidencing their dis-
satisfaction with them .... Though still on the books, they contradict the
spirit of the times.
Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 356-57, 222 A2d 205, 209-10 (1966).
Without discoursing at great length, it can be said that wrongful death
limitations serve little purpose. So strong has been the reaction to such
limitations that some courts have upheld the application of the wrongful
death law of non-forum states but have at the same time disallowed the
limitation of those laws on public policy grounds. See Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, 9 N.Y2d 34, [172 N.E2d 526, 211 N.Y.S2d 133 (1961)]; Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, 309 F2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
Tiernan v. Westext Transport, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (D.R.I. 1969)..
We are of the opinion that experience has demonstrated no necessity
for continuing the doctrine of immunity as a defense in tort actions brought
by a parent against a child. Our conclusion is influenced by the increasing
frequency and severity of automobile accidents and the seriousness of attendant
injuries to members of the same household. The fact that in most instances
the driver is covered by liability insurance minimizes the likelihood of intra-
family discord. While, of course, our decision will also affect the uninsured
and will reach into family activities beyond the operation of an auto-
mobile, the prospect of vexatious or collusive litigation we believe has no
substantial basis. Only where a serious wrong has been committed is it likely
that children's torts will be brought to the attention of the courts. Otherwise,
we are persuaded that the good judgment, restraint, and discernment of
parents, lawyers, judges, and juries will act as an effective deterrent to the
prosecution of fraudulent or frivolous litigation.
Balts v. Baits, 273 Minm. 419, 433, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (1956).
'5 2 B. Cuaa, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFI.IcT OF LAWS 105 (1963) [here-
inafter cited as CumuE].
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This phenomenon is not a new one. It appeared as soon as courts
felt free to apply a law other than that of the forum. 5 3  Result selec-
tivity'" has found expression in the classification of statutes as
"odious," 155 in the public policy reservation, 55 and in the astute use
of such "escape devices" '-7 as renvoi and characterization. Not all
of the moderns are entirely adverse to it; witness such notions as
"emerging" and "regressive" rules, 55 and the mention of justice in the
individual case 9 or the better rule of law ... in lists enumerating choice
of law desiderata. At present,' 6 ' the most outspoken advocate of a
teleological approach is Leflar, who, in his discussion of choice-influenc-
ing considerations, vigorously defends the propriety of applying the
better rule of law.
162
1. Modern Methodologies
Opinions in cases that have adopted modern theories have ex-
plicitly referred to "justice, fairness, and the best practical result" as a
justification for modern analysis.'3 In fact, most of the cases in which
courts abandoned the lex loci rule involved avoidance of noxious sub-
stantive law.' However, the precedent of decisions in which the
153 See the gloss ascribed to Aldricus set forth and discussed in Yntema, The
Comity Doctrine, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 9, 12 (1966).
154 See LEFLAR 217.
155See references in EHREIZWEIG, P.I.L. 97, 153.
156 Id. 153-68.
1 57 
LEFLAR 217.
158 A. vox MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 377,
394, 407-08 (1965).
159 Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 959,
980-81 (1952).
100 L0 ELAR 254.
161 For earlier statements favoring teleology see Freund, Chief Justice Stone
and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1210, 1214 (1946) ; Lorenzen, Territorial-
ity, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924) ; Yntema, supra
note 153. See Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F2d 189, 206 (2d Cir.
1955) (Frank, J., dissenting).
162 LEFLAR 216-18, 254-59. See also D. Currie, in Comments on Reich v. Purcell,
15 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 595 (1968) ; Ehrenzweig, in id. 570; Horowitz, in id. 631, 636;
Leflar, in id. 637, 640; Scoles, in id. 563.
16- Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y2d 473, 481, 191 N.E2d 279, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743, 749 (1963) ; see Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617, 618 (7th Cir. 1965)
(lex loci delicti "[fails] to cope with the complexities of modern day multistate
occurrences") ; Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (N.D.
Ill. 1968) ("lex loci delicti rule . . . worked injustices").
64 Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(owner's liability) ; Merchant's Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp.
409 (D.N.D. 1967) (wrongful death limitation); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz.
562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968) (intrafamily immunity); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551,
432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967) (wrongful death limitation) ; Wessling v. Paris,
417 S.W2d 259 (Ky. 1967) (guest statute); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158
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courts avoided an undesirable rule by abandoning lex loci often has
compelled the same courts in later cases to apply a law which was equally
undesirable." Moreover, preoccupation with analysis in terms of
interests and policies may have served to inhibit, rather than to promote,
discussion of the much more fundamental question: whether it is proper
to use the law of conflicts for the avowed purpose of result selectivity.'66
A methodology that is oriented towards the competing claims of in-
terested states can provide the flexibility necessary to enable courts to
reach just results.' 67 But once the highest court decides a case, the
holding is law, even though the court applied modern methodology in
reaching its decision. It may be inordinately difficult later to avoid the
logic of an earlier opinion. 6 Having decided Babcock, the New York
Court of Appeals could not have reached the same result as the Third
Judicial Department in Kell v. Henderson, unless it abolished the rule
of stare decisis. Consistency would have required the judges to repress
N.W.2d 254 (1968) (guest statute) ; Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968)
(contributory negligence) ; Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A2d 205 (1966) (guest
statute); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967) (guest statute);
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y2d 473, 191 N.E2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (guest
statute) ; Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A2d 796 (1964) (survival
of action) ; Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A. 2d 917 (R.I. 1968), petition for cert.
dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1969) (guest statute). But see Casey v. Manson Constr. &
Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P2d 898 (1967). After a thorough discussion, the
Oregon Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) test to deny a wife domi-
ciled in Oregon recovery for loss of consortium by applying Washington law on the
grounds that Washington, the place of injury, had the more significant relationship.
Other cases in which courts abandoned lex loci but failed to avoid application of a
distasteful rule include Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965)
(wrongful death limitation) ; Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E2d 544 (1966)
(intrafamily immunity) ; Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W2d 410 (1965)
(wrongful death limitation).
105 See Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W2d 831 (Iowa 1968) (guest statute) ; Johnson
v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A2d 781 (1966) (intrafamily immunity); Dym v.
Gordon, 16 NX.Y2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) (guest statute);
cf. Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do sul, S. A. (Cruzeiro), 359 F.2d 855 (2d
Cir. 1966) (wrongful death limitation); Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533
(E.D. Wis. 1968) (wrongful death limitation); Shaver v. Soo Line R.R., 284 F.
Supp. 701 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (wrongful death right of action); Cashman v. Evans,
249 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (guest statute).
186 For a discussion of the problematic nature of the result selectivity approach
see Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAt. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1963).
167
[O]ne cannot easily suppress the suspicion, or should we say the hope, that it
was . . . a "better-rule" motivation, rather than the invoked nonrule of the
"most significant relationship," . . . that led the New York Court of Appeals
so to interpret the forum rule spatially as to permit in one case "a substantial
recovery" for a crash death under Pennsylvania law (rather than limited
damages under Maryland law) ; and in another case, a direct action against
a liability insurer under Puerto Rico law (against a "procedural" forum rule
to the contrary).
EHRENZWEiG, P.I.L. 100 (footnotes omitted).
368 See cases cited note 165 stpra. In Rosenberg, An Opinion for the New York
Court of Appeals, in Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 459, 464
(1967), the author likens the effort of throwing away a choice of law rule to that
of throwing away a boomerang, in view of stare decisis.
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their sympathies for the injured party and to deny recovery, in a case in
which the lex loci rule would have made the victim whole.
It can of course be argued that a party may not complain if the
law of his home state is applied, whatever the content of such law may
be. But if the unfairness is rooted in an unjust substantive rule, this
argument has little cogency. Applying the Massachusetts ceiling on
wrongful death recovery to a case which has no foreign contacts what-
ever is equally as unfair as applying it to an interstate situation. The
only difference is that no other rule is conceivably available. Yet in no
real sense is a Massachusetts citizen accountable for such pernicious
law.' Subjecting domiciliaries of a state to its draconic rules is less,
but only somewhat less, perverse than the extension of such precepts to
strangers. Kell illustrates that judges may not be satisfied that applica-
tion of the party's "home law" is necessarily fair, even though all relevant
contacts other than the "fortuitous" place of accident point to that law.
Although sophisticated courts may be flexible enough to avoid the
consequences of earlier pronouncements, as exemplified by the decision
of the New York Court of Appeals in Miller v. Miller,' others will be
less inclined to stretch precedent to avoid application of an onerous law,
and some may go so far as to adopt new methodologies to reach regret-
table results. 71 Flexible approaches are less unsatisfactory than rigid
rules only to the extent they are manipulated with agility. Manipulation,
however, is contrary to the spirit in which these approaches were con-
ceivedY 2 Currie denied that it could or should be the function of courts
to favor the better law, because in his opinion they lack both the freedom
and the competence to do so.' 3 Cavers was said to have advocated
justice in the individual case,'74 but if he ever did,' he has since re-
1'69See D. CummE, supra note 162, at 599; Wright, The Federal Courts and the
Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 317, 328 (1967).
17022 N.Y2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
' 71 See Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965); Wartell v.
Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966) ; Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268,
132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428
P.2d 898 (1967).
1-72But see Hancock, The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye, 1931-1959:
Marital Immunity for Torts in Conflict of Laws, 29 U. C1. L. REv. 237, 252-58
(1962); Horowitz, in Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 631, 636
(1968) ; Scoles, in id., 563, 567-69; Weintraub, in id., 556; Weintraub, A Method for
Solving Conflicts Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215, 238, 249 (1962). Baade
says that governmental interest analysis is one application of teleological interpreta-
tion. Baade, Counter-revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading
Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEXAs L. REv. 141, 149 (1967). But see id.,
154-56.
173 E.g., CurRIE 104-06, 133, 153-54.
174 See, e.g., Kenison, C.J., in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 357, 222 A2d 205,
210 (1966) ; Cheatharn & Reese, supra note 159, at 959, 980-81; CURRE 159 n.82.
175 See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HA v. L. REv. 173,
193 (1933).
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canted.' Reese listed justice as one of the policy factors of conflicts,'
but, as Reporter for the Second Restatement, substantially reduced its
significance .'
7
But it is of course incongruous to direct judges to inquire into the
content and policies of potentially applicable substantive law, and to
admonish them, at the same time, to refrain from a selection motivated
by their desire to do justice. In his early article, Cavers asserted that
"only a judge in whom the legal mind . . . has hypertrophied could
exclude from consideration the consequences of the application of the
proffered law to the facts of the given case." 179 A judge freed from
the blindfolds with which lex loci had adorned him and equipped with
the telescope of functional analysis should not be expected to be im-
pervious to what he sees. The degree of hypertrophy postulated by
such an expectation should be sufficient to disqualify a judge from
holding office.'80
Given the present fluidity of conflicts law, the question whether it
is proper and desirable that courts adopt a result-selective approach may
already have been answered.""' The vacillation and uncertainty, in
theory 8 .as well as in practice,'" in the jurisdictions which have joined
the conflicts revolution would strongly suggest a return to the lex loci
167 CAWERS 75-87.
'77 Cheatham & Reese, supra note 159, at 980.
118 According to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (d) (Pro-
posed Official Draft, part I, May 2, 1967), one of the factors relevant to choice of
law is the protection of justified expectations. According to comment g, id. 18, there
are no expectations to protect whenever parties act without giving thought to the
legal consequences of their conduct, particularly in the area of negligence.
179 Cavers, supra note 175, at 181.
180 Given his decisions in Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944
(1953), Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P2d 218 (1955), and Bernkrant v.
Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961), which do seem to
evince a very definite spirit of enlightenment on the part of Judge Traynor, as well
as a talent for deft manipulation, one feels tempted to ask whether the judge would
feel constrained by the logic of his decision in Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432
P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967), to decide the cases posited by Cavers, in Comments
on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 647, 648, 652 (1968), in the manner suggested
by Cavers. Some comments on the case seem to express concern that the judge
may find himself hoisted by his own petard. See Scoles, in id. 569; Weintraub, in id.
561-63. But the judge's opinion would seem to leave some leeway for the disposition
of future cases in a result-selective fashion, if only by seizing upon the words "interests
of litigants," 67 Cal. 2d at 553, 432 P.2d at 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 33, which he used
in conjunction with the interests of states he analyzed.
181 See notes 153-62 supra & accompanying text. Apart from the result selectivity
inherent in the modern theories, the opportunities offered by long-arm legislation work
in plaintiff's favor. See note 187 infra & accompanying text.
182 See D. Currie, in Comments oi "Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 595,
595-97 (1968).
183 Compare Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963), and Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E2d 380, 274 N.Y.S2d
591 (1966), with Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S2d 463
(1966), and Cashman v. Evans, 249 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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or some other stable184 rule. Only if the justice of the end result is
considered to be a desideratum of a higher order than impartiality
should neutral choice of law rules be discarded. It may be singularly
inappropriate to burden conflicts law with the responsibility for results,
but it is certainly not impossible. There are several forms that a
teleological approach can take.
2. Alternative Reference Rules
As noted earlier,"" the real difficulty in many cases lies not with
conflicts theory, but with substantive tort law, and in particular with
rules which arbitrarily inhibit or diminish recovery. An alternative
reference rule is a simple expedient to resolve the problem. Such a rule
would entitle the victim to the most favorable of the potentially ap-
plicable rules.
There is nothing new or unusual about such a solution. Lorenzen
noted, with apparent approval, that the former German Supreme Court
"interpreted" its lex loci rule in such a manner that the law which is
most favorable to the injured party is always applied.'86 Ehrenzweig's
forum preference is partly motivated by the consideration that, in view
of modern long-arm legislation, the lex fori rule "will usually result in
the plaintiff's option to choose the law most favorable to him." 187
It has been said that a similar idea underlies Cavers's Principles of Pref-
erence; 18S and the Second Restatement explicitly recognizes alternative
reference rules in the areas of usury 1s9 and trusts. 90
Thus, in several instances, conflicts rules have been charged with
the specific task of furnishing proper results from diffuse and disparate
substantive laws. It is true that the justification advanced in the Re-
statement for alternative reference rules in trusts and usury may not
apply to torts, where disparities are not limited to percentage points 191
18 4 In abandoning the lex loci rule, the Kentucky Court of Appeals said:
We recognize that an attempt to apply this rule [the Restatement test] in
complex situations might involve an unstable exercise in legal gymnastics.
Consequently, at this time we limit the application of this rule to a very clear
case ..
Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Ky. 1967). This statement prompted Judge
Montgomery to wonder in dissent: "Does this mean that in an unclear case a differ-
ent rule will obtain?" Id.
185 See text accompanying notes 145-51 supra.
186 Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 47 L.Q. RFv. 483, 491-94
(1931); see EHRENzWEiG, TREATISE 555 n.31, 597.
187 EHERNZWEIG, TREATISE 555.
188 E.g., Baade, supra note 172, at 162-63.
189RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §203(2) (Proposed Official
Draft, part II, May 1, 1968).
190 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 269(b) (ii) (Proposed
Official Draft, part III, April 22, 1969).
1
9 1
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §203, comment b at
294-95 (Proposed Official Draft, part II, May 1, 1968).
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and life spans, 92 but indemnification of tort victims is surely of no lesser
importance than the "expectations of the parties" to a usurious con-
tract. 93 As a general proposition, it would not seem unreasonble to let
the onus of conflicting laws be borne by the tortfeasor rather than by
his victim."
3. Public Policy
A blunter tool that might be used for purposes of result-selectivity
is the notion of public policy. 9 ' One difficulty with this doctrine is,
however, that nonapplication of foreign law which violates forum policy
might leave the plaintiff without any remedy. 9 ' Although with some
ingenuity this result can be avoided, as Judge Desmond's opinion in
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.197 indicates, public policy, unlike an
alternative reference rule, does not afford the possibility of avoiding un-
desirable forum law. Moreover, the propensity of the doctrine to inter-
fere with, rather than to foster, conflicts analysis, has been noted, 98 and
persuasive arguments have been advanced against the propriety of apply-
ing it to interstate (as opposed to international) conflicts cases. 99
192See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 269, comment i at 199
(Proposed Official Draft, part III, April 22, 1969).
193 Validation of usurious contracts by means of an alternative reference rule
has not escaped cogent criticism. See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws 485 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as EHRENzwEiG, TREATISE]; Note, Usury in the Conflict of Laws:
The Doctrine of the Lex Debitoris, 55 CALF. L. REv. 123, 148-80 (1967).
194
In torts, the plaintiff has no opportunity to bargain about the relationship
between the parties. He is the innocent victim who suffers by an event fortuitous
as regards his participation. As compared to the plaintiff, the defendant has less
fortuitous participation by reason of his negligence.
Scoles, in Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 563, 569 (1968).
195 The concept has been strongly attacked by Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy"
in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLum. L. REV. 969 (1956) ; cf. D. CAvERs, THE CHoICE
OF LAW PROCESS 201 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CAVERs]. Contra, A. EHRENzWEIG,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (1967) [hereinafter cited as EHRENzwEiG, P.I.L.].
196 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) ; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 & comment a at 330-31 (Proposed Official Draft, part I,
May 2, 1967). But see Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F2d
246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
197 9 N.Y2d 34, 172 N.E2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). Characterization of a
rule as "procedural" can of course produce the same result. In Kilberg, Judge
Desmond used this technique to bolster his other line of reasoning. Id. at 41, 172
N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137. The classical case for result-selective application
of the term "procedural" is Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953)
(applying California survival statute to Arizona accident in the aegis of the lex loci
rule). See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 657, 670
n.35 (1959).
198 Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 195, at 1016.
'199Id. 1012-16; Griswold, quoted in CAVERS 22; RESTATEMENT (SECoNDu) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90, comment c at 331-32 (Proposed Official Draft, part I,
May 2, 1967).
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4. The Better Rule
The most explicit recognition of the result-selective approach is the
selection of the substantive rule which, in the opinion of the court, is the
best law. Arguably, at least two states have already adopted this approach
for tort choice of law. In Clark v. Clark 20o and Conklin v. Homer 201
the supreme courts of New Hampshire and Wisconsin applied forum law
to compensate automobile passengers; in the process they rejected
potentially applicable sister state guest statutes that might have barred
recovery. In modern parlance, the New Hampshire case was an "easy"
one, the Wisconsin case "difficult." 202 In Clark, application of any of
the various modern methods could have yielded the same result since all
relevant factors except the "fortuitous" place of accident pointed to New
Hampshire. In Conklin, the law-fact pattern was exactly the reverse.
In other words, the two cases presented the New Hampshire and
Wisconsin courts with the very problems that Babcock and Kell posed
in New York. Both of the latter cases relied on Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations, 203 but they deemphasized in varying degrees
the importance of other considerations in favor of the last item on
Leflar's list-that is, application of the better rule of law. Addressing
himself to this consideration, Judge Kenison, speaking for the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire, said:
We prefer to apply the better rule of law in conflicts cases just
as is done in nonconflicts cases, when the choice is open to us.
If the law . . . is outmoded, an unrepealed remnant of a by-
gone age, "a drag on the coattails of civilization," . . . we
will try to see our way clear to apply our own law instead. If
it is our own law that is obsolete or senseless (and it could be)
we will try to apply the other state's law. Courts have always
done this in conflicts cases, but have usually covered up what
they have done by employing manipulative techniques .... 204
The same emphasis on result-selectivity reasoning appears from Judge
Heffernan's opinion in the Conklin case. 5 If result-selectivity is the
decisive factor, Conklin is consistent with Clark.
It is interesting to compare the treatment of governmental interests
in the two cases. Stating that it was his duty to further New Hamp-
200 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966). See Baade, supra note 172, at 152-55 for
a discussion of this case as a "better rule" decision.
201 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W2d 579 (1968).
2 Cf. Trautman, A Comment, in Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLum.
L. REv. 465, 468 (1967).
20 3 See note 87 supra & accompanying text.
204 107 N.H. at 355, 222 A.2d at 209.
205 38 Wis. 2d at 484-85, 157 N.W2d at 587. It is clear from his citation of Kell v.
Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S2d 647 (1965), and of Rosenberg, An Opinion
for the New York Court of Appeals, in Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 CoLum.
L. REv. 459 (1967), that Judge Heffernan knew exactly what he was doing. Id. at
485-86 n.12, 157 N.W2d at 587-88 n.11.
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shire's governmental interests in favor of New Hampshire residents,
Judge Kenison interpreted Vermont's interests as only relating to
actions brought in Vermont courts and affecting Vermont parties.20
Yet earlier in his opinion he asserted that in "most private litigation the
only real governmental interest that the forum has is in the fair and
efficient administration of justice." 207 After finding that Wisconsin
had a serious concern over accidents occurring on its highways, Judge
Heffernan determined that a true conflict therefore existed,2 08 but
thought it unlikely "that Illinois governmental interests are so con-
cerned that retaliatory conduct would ensue." 209 He also quoted a
passage from another recent Wisconsin case, Zelinger v. State Sand &
Gravel Company,' ° which indicated that the court "would apply the
law of a non-forum state if it were the better law." 211
The language in these cases, their peculiar treatment of govern-
mental interests, the manner in which they disposed of earlier deci-
sions,2 12 and the dissent in Conklin 1 3 all suggest that both courts opted
206 107 N.H. at 356, 222 A2d at 209-10.
207 Id. at 355, 222 A2d at 208-09.
208 38 Wis. 2d at 475, 157 N.W2d at 582.
209 Id. at 479, 157 N.W2d at 584.
210 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W2d 466 (1968).
21138 Wis. 2d at 484, 157 N.W2d at 587 (quoting Zelinger v. State Sand &
Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 98, 113, 156 N.W.2d 466, 473 (1968)). Along the same lines,
see the quote from Judge Kenison's opinion in Clark v. Clark in text accompanying
note 204 supra.
212 The development of the law in Wisconsin neatly demonstrates the evolutionary
process that preceded, and must have influenced, the court's determination in Conklin
v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968). Wisconsin began with the lex
fori rule, Anderson v. Milwaukee & St. P. R.R., 37 Wis. 321 (1875), and shifted to
loci delicti in Bain v. Northern Pac. R.R., 120 Wis. 412, 98 N.W. 241 (1904). In
Hanmschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W2d 814 (1959), the court
evaded the undesirable result which would have followed from an application of the
lex loci delicti rule by characterizing the question of interspousal immunity as one of
family law, not of tort law. See Hancock, The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye,
1931-1959: Marital Immunity For Torts in Conflict of Laws, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 237
(1962). The Wisconsin Supreme Court abandoned lex loci delicti in Wilcox v.
Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965), applying the law of the state with
the most significant relationship. In the Wilcox opinion, Judge Heffernan spoke of
a flexible approach which would lead to just results, and suggested an alternative
reference rule. In Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967), the
court adopted an approach based on the relative interests of the states involved.
It switched to Leflar's choice-influencing considerations in Zelinger v. State Sand &
Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W2d 466 (1968). Shortly thereafter, the same
court decided Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W2d 579 (1968) in which it
emphasized the better law rule. The significance of the fact that Conklin is the
culmination of a development that has run the full gamut of all the theories before
arriving at the better rule approach has, however, not been grasped by the federal
courts. See Turner v. Pfluger, 407 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Satchwill v. Vollrath
Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
A similar development occurred in New Hampshire. See Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H.
82, 174 A. 508 (1934); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A2d 439 (1963);
Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966) ; Dow v. Larrabee, 107 N.H.
70, 217 A2d 506 (1966) ; Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
213 judge Hallows, the author of the majority opinion in Zelinger v. State Sand
& Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W2d 466 (1968), in which the court adopted
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for a "better law" rule.214 At least, they pose the question of the
propriety, desirability, and workability of selecting competing rules on
the basis of their intrinsic merits.215
One advantage of the better law rule over lex loci is that it can be
applied to torts involving injury to intangible interests."1 Unlike
alternative reference rules, it could weed out inequities that may unduly
favor plaintiffs, such as provisions for punitive damages, in addition to
compensating injured parties. In contrast to the rigid adherence to the
lex fori, general acceptance of this approach would not encourage the
unseemly spectacle of forum shopping, if the courts are serious about
their stated intention to apply a better foreign rule.2t7 This would work
in favor of less resourceful plaintiffs and would prevent powerful de-
fendants from gaining an unfair advantage by selecting a suitable juris-
diction in which to bring a declaratory judgment action.218
Another advantage of the "better law" rule is that it does not in-
volve the hazards of uncertainty and lack of predictability inherent in
current methodology. A court adopting it would not purport to ad-
minister justice ad hoc,21 but would have to state the reasons why one
tort rule is preferable to another. It is true that reasonable men can
Leflar's choice-influencing considerations, dissented from the better-rule decision in
Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 490-91, 157 N.W2d 579, 590 (1968):
The majority opinion, which like the professors, concludes the law of the
forum should be applied is based upon the premise that the host-guest statute
is bad law, serves no legitimate purpose, and should be circumvented. The
fifth choice-influencing consideration, the better law, then becomes the para-
mount if not the controlling factor. But in Heath and in Zellinger, we made it
clear that none of the choice-influencing considerations standing alone is to be
considered controlling.214 See EHRENZWEIG, P.I.L. 97-98, 100-03; Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and
the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in Multistate Tort Law, 53 U. VA. L. REv.
847 (1967) ; Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 1968 ANN. SuRvEY OF Am. LAw 31, 47 (1969) ;
cf. Baade, supra note 172, at 154-56. But see Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp.
533 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (preferring governmental interest and policy of Wisconsin
over better rule approach to apply Wisconsin limitation on wrongful death recovery).
215 Minnesota, Mississippi, and Rhode Island have also opted for Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations. Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254
(1968) (nonapplication of sister state guest statute); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d
509 (Miss. 1968) (application of Mississippi comparative negligence statute) ; Brown
v. Church of Holy Name of Jesus, - RI. -, 252 A2d 176 (1969) (nonapplication of
sister state wrongful death act and charitable immunity); Woodward v. Stewart,
243 A.2d 917 (R.I. 1968), petition for cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1968). The
Schneider and Woodward cases are fairly explicit in their assertion of superiority
of forum over sister state law on point. In Friday v. Smoot, - Del. -, 211 A2d
594 (1965), the Supreme Court of Delaware retained lex loci and granted recovery,
refusing to apply a guest statute. The result in this case, although based on a lex loci
rationale, led Baade to characterize it as a "better law" decision. See Baade, supra
note 172, at 146 n.30.
218SSee text accompanying notes 136-37 supra.
21 7 See R LEFLAm, AmERcAN CoNflicTs LAW 256-57 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as LEzLAR]; Kramer, Interests and Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 RuTGERs
L. REv. 523, 560-61 (1959).
21s For a discussion of this possibility see Baade, supra note 172, at 175-78.
219 See LEFLAR 216-18, 254-59, for the difference between the preferred law, which
he considers a legitimate consideration, and the unprincipled choice of the "better
party."
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differ, but it is difficult to conceive of a bench composed of guest statute
enthusiasts," ° devotees of limited wrongful death recovery, or intra-
family immunity aficionados. The danger of multiple appeals, split deci-
sions and reversals would be effectively curbed by the stare decisis effect
of a decision passing on the soundness of a given torts rule. A change of
views would tend to occur only after a major reorientation of tort
philosophy. Nor would it be too difficult to determine the jurisdictions
whose law is potentially applicable; they can be readily ascertained from
Supreme Court cases dealing with such questions as the permissible
reach of state workmen's compensation acts.221
That this approach parallels the conflicts rule of section 1-105 (1)
of the Uniform Commercial Code has not escaped judicial attention.'
This provision, adopted in almost all states, requires application of the
Code on the ground of self-proclaimed superiority 223 to any transaction
that bears "an appropriate" relation to the forum state.
IV. CONCLUSION
The acceptance of modern methodology by the courts has posed
serious problems for the administration of justice in interstate tort
cases. 224  Courts should cut short their dalliance with theories and
methodologies and focus on the narrow, but important, question whether
to accept or reject teleology in tort choice of law. Once this question
has been answered one way or the other, it will not be too difficult to
devise acceptable rules to implement this policy decision.
The propriety of applying choice of law considerations for the
avowed purpose of reaching the right result may well be doubted. How-
ever, if it is conceded that courts may use the freedom of choice inherent
in a conflicts situation in a result-selective manner, the "better law" rule
must be considered seriously. In view of the present state of torts choice
of law it may be too late to argue that judges lack such freedom.2  The
220 Baade, supra note 172, at 155.
2 21 See Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965) ; Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S.
408 (1955) ; Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947) ; Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
An unreasonable choice of law may be overturned by the Supreme Court on due
process grounds, Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), and, perhaps, on the
basis of the full faith and credit clause. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
Except in the case of "transient jurisdiction," EHRENZWEiG, TREATISE 103-10; EHREN-
ZWEIG, P.I.L. 107-10, application of the forum law would presumably be certiorari-
proof. Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
222 Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 630-31, 133 N.W2d 408, 415 (1965).
- UNFoRm CoMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105, Comment 3. As to the merits of this
claim compare LExLAR 228, with Ehrenzweig, Book Review, 16 Am. J. CoMp. L. 615,
619 (1968). See also Panel Discussion on the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 Bus.
LAW. 49, 68-75 (1956).
224 See Rosenberg, supra note 205, at 459-60; Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v.
Purcell 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 641, 645-47 (1968).
E2See text accompanying notes 212-15 supra.
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manner in which they presently exercise discretion suggests that they
are influenced by the quality of conflicting substantive rules from which
they are asked to select.226 It can hardly be said that judges are not
equipped to make evaluations of this kind. The determination of what
is fair poses less of a problem than application of some of the thornier
new methodologies. Most of our tort law is judge-made and, except
for occasional aberrations 2 7 judges on the whole have been at least as
astute in creating tort rules as legislatures. The manner in which they
resorted to praetorian powers " to develop a law of products liability
is a cogent example.' That they will use these powers in an irrational
fashion is unlikely so long as they are compelled to articulate reasons
for preferring one rule over another and so long as court decisions can
be overturned by constitutional review and legislative action. More-
over, most of the cases will be "easy" ones. There are hardly two points
of view about guest statutes, limitations on wrongful death recovery,
and intrafamily immunity.2 30  Other situations might pose more trouble-
some problems," 1 but having to cope with such problems would not
cause a misallocation of judicial resources. Reasoned opinions about
the merits of a particular rule are of great practical value. Such opinions
might induce legislatures to amend noxious domestic laws.2 32  At the
very least, injustice in particular cases could be avoided.
2
26 See text accompanying notes 163-64, 181 supra.
227See, e.g., Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808). The fact
that this rule was modified by statute, Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93
(Lord Campbell's Act), in turn had unfortunate consequences. The assumed need
for statutes "creating" wrongful death recovery led other judges astray. See The
Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).22 This phenomenon is not unique to common law countries. See R. DAviD &
H. DE VRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYsTm 82, 95-96 (1958); A. voN MzHREN, THE
Civit LAW SYSTEm 337-462 (1957); IL SCHLESINGER, ComPARAT VE LAW 49-50,
360-65, 372-82 (2d ed. 1959). The framers of the Rome Treaty were content to leave
it up to the Court of Justice of the European Communities to fashion rules
governing the liability of the European Economic Community for damage caused by
its institutions or employees "in accordance with the general principles common to the
laws of the Member States." Treaty Establishing The European Economic Community
art. 215(2), effective Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 3. See generally Peck, The Role
of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265
(1963).
229See Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 NoTRE DAME
LAw. 501 (1964); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consuner), 69 Y.LE L.J. 1099 (1960); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defec-
tive Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965).
23o See note 151 supra.
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This case is a comparatively easy one, and in cases like it the result will
hereafter be reasonably easy for lawyers and trial judges to calculate.
Admittedly there will be harder cases, more difficult to decide, cases that
will not yield sure answers in terms of proper choice-influencing considera-
tions as readily as this case does. That will not be a new phenomenon in
conflict of laws. . . . Most of the choice-of-law rules and results that have
been reached in the past were supported by good sense and sound practical
analysis ....
Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 357, 222 A2d 205, 210 (1966) (Kenison, C.J.).23 2 See EHRENZWEIG, P.I.L. 102-03; Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Con-
flict of Laws, 59 HAv. L. REv. 1210, 1216 (1946).
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Perhaps more important than the power and wisdom of the oracles
of the law is their willingness to admit motives. The courage and
honesty of the New Hampshire and Wisconsin judges and their avoid-
ance of "gimmicks" and "cover-up" devices 3 3 must be admired. Their
unabashed avowal of purposes places them beyond the reproach of in-
tellectual dishonesty which recourse to subterfuge inevitably merits."3
Their opinions leave little doubt in the minds of the lawyers in these
jurisdictions about the disposition of future cases. These opinions
refute the contention that the teleological approach is a form of un-
principled cadi justice.
It has been said that "asking the judge simply to express a prefer-
ence between . . . two rules on the score of 'justice and convenience'
is to abolish our centuries-old subject." 2- Indeed, if other jurisdictions
were to follow the lead of New Hampshire and Wisconsin and adopt
the better law rule, a uniform substantive law of interstate torts would
emerge. Such a development, which is not entirely unprecedented,230
would spell the end of tort choice of law between the states of the Union.
But the development of a rational body of rules bearing the imprimatur
of judicial certification of superiority may be a more pleasing prospect
than the demise of state law through federal preemption.1
7
As far as the subject of conflicts of law is concerned, it will weather
the shock of uniformity in any given area of the law. Too much
diversity remains. If private law conflicts should become uninteresting,
the clash of regulatory laws, such as antitrust and securities legislation,
offers a tempting field for exploration. If interstate conflicts are no
longer sufficiently attractive, private international law presents the chal-
lenge. Lawyers will continue to find conflicts law "one of the most
baffling subjects of legal science," 23s because it attempts to reconcile
the irreconcilable. The real danger for the pundits is that their
stuporific shadowboxing will drive away their audience.239
233 LrYA.R 257-59.
234 Griswold, cited in Baade, supra note 172, at 161.
2 3 5 CAvEas 86.
2 3 6 For a discussion of the handling of the mobile torts of yesteryear by American
admiralty courts see EHRENZWEiG, P.I.L. 204-07, 222-23, 227-28.
237 For the latter possibility, see Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 591-92, 249
N.E2d 394, 408, 301 N.Y.S2d 519, 538-39 (1969) (Burke, J., concurring) ; Rosenberg,
in Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 641, 645-46 (1968).
238 B. CARnozo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCN CE 67 (1928).
239
Wherever one's sympathies, gallons of ink spill across the law review pages
as the conflicts revolution engages a counter-revolution in a rhubarb as
esoteric and perplexing as anything American law has ever known.
Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L.
REv. 317, 334 (1967).
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